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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MARK DERON HARRISON, : Case No. 890617-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In addition to relying on and reasserting the contents of 
his opening brief, Mr. Harrison replies to the State's brief as 
follows: 
The prosecutor's peremptory challenges of Ms. Gomez and 
Ms. Rezendez require reversal of Mr. Harrison's conviction. While 
the record relating to the timing of the objection to the peremptory 
challenges is not clear, under the governing law, this Court should 
reach the merits of the issue. The adequacy of the prima facie case 
triggering the prosecutor's explanation of the challenges is moot 
because the prosecutor explained his challenges. The prosecutor's 
explanation of the challenges was not related to the facts of the 
case or legitimate, and Mr. Harrison is therefore entitled to a new 
trial. In the alternative, the record of all facts and 
circumstances demonstrates that prosecutor's discriminatory intent 
and requires that Mr. Harrison receive a new trial. 
Mr. Harrison should have been allowed to present a concrete 
explanation of why he made a practice of carrying a gun, and to 
support his testimony that he was carrying the gun all night long to 
protect himself and did not retrieve it in the midst of the disputes 
with Grant Glover7s group with the intent to shoot Mr. Glover. The 
importance of this evidence to Mr. Harrison's defense, which he is 
constitutionally entitled to present, outweighs the remote 
possibility that the jurors might have been confused by this 
evidence. 
Similarly, Mr. Harrison should have been allowed to present 
to the jurors the preliminary hearing testimony of John Bray 
concerning whether Mr. Harrison had said that he was going home to 
retrieve his gun in the midst of the disputes with Grant Glover's 
group. The fact that Mr. Bray's trial and preliminary hearing 
testimony on this issue is so confusing is not reason to keep it 
from the jurors, whose function is always to resolve confusing 
relevant evidence. 
The prosecutor's comments on Mr. Harrison's exercise of his 
marital privilege, right against self-incrimination, attorney client 
privilege, and other comments were improper and prejudicial to 
Mr. Harrison's case. 
The gun seized from the Harrison diaper bag should have 
been suppressed. Mr. Harrison had a legitimate privacy interest in 
the bag and a property interest in the gun. The search cannot be 
justified by the State's belated characterization of the search as 
"incident to arrest." The pat down search of the diaper bag did not 
occur when the diaper bag with the gun zipped in the inner pocket 
was within the scope of Mr. or Mrs. Harrison's control. 
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I. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE. 
In response to Mr. Harrison's argument that he was denied 
equal protection of the law when the prosecutor's explanation of his 
peremptory challenge demonstrated, rather than negated, group bias,1 
the State responds: (1) the claim was waived because the objection 
was raised after the jury was sworn,2 and (2) Mr. Harrison failed to 
make a prima facie case of discrimination requiring an explanation 
from the prosecutor.3 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE. 
1. The record on the timing of the objection is 
unclear. 
The apparent basis of the State's waiver argument is its 
apparent perception that the objection to the peremptory challenge 
followed the swearing in of the jurors.4 
The record relating to this issue is ambiguous, and the 
pertinent transcript pages are included in Appendix 1 to this 
brief. 
On page 74, the transcript indicates that the jurors were 
given the oath and impanelled (T. 74 lines 11 and 12). It appears, 
however, that defense counsel interrupted, "Judge Young [sic]: Your 
1
 Appellant's opening brief at 12 through 18. 
2
 Appellee's brief at 7-8. 
3
 Appellee's brief at 8-10. 
4
 Appellee's brief at 7-8. 
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Honor, may we approach the bench before you proceed with this?" 
(T. 74 lines 14 and 15). In chambers, the court then indicated, 
"The record may show that we're again convened prior to the 
impanelling of the final jury at the request of the defense to make 
objections as to the method of the State in exercising its 
challenges" (T. 75 lines 3 through 6). At the conclusion of the 
chambers discussions, the court then had the jurors stand and asked 
the parties if the jurors standing were those selected, and 
indicated that they had already received the oath (T. 79 lines 4 
through 11). The court then dismissed the potential jurors who were 
not selected and seated the jurors (T. 79 lines 12 through 19). 
Because the court reporter did not transcribe the oath of 
the jurors, it cannot be determined if defense counsel's objection 
occurred during the swearing in of the jurors. The indication in 
the transcript that the jurors were sworn and impanelled, followed 
by the trial court's indication that the objection in chambers was 
occurring prior to the impanelling of the jurors, gives further 
cause to question the adequacy of the transcript supporting the 
waiver argument. 
The absence of an objection by the State on the grounds of 
timeliness and the uncertainty in the record are reason enough for 
this Court to reject the State's waiver argument. Cf. Salt Lake 
County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah 1989) (objections must be 
raised so that record on appeal is adequate to facilitate appellate 
review of circumstances surrounding peremptory challenges). 
- 4 
2. The governing law indicates that the objection 
was timely. 
In arguing that the issue concerning the prosecutor's 
peremptory challenges was waived, the State relies primarily on Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which reads, 
(1) Within seven days after the moving party 
discovered, or by the exercise of diligence could 
have discovered the grounds therefore, and in any 
event before the trial jury is sworn to try the 
case, a party may move to stay the proceedings or 
to quash an indictment, or for other appropriate 
relief, on the ground of substantial failure to 
comply with this act in selecting a grand or 
trial jury. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this 
section are the exclusive means by which a person 
accused of a crime, the state, or a party in a 
civil case may challenge a jury on the ground 
that the jury was not selected in conformity with 
this act. 
(emphasis added). 
While the record in this case is not clear as to whether 
the objection occurred before the jurors were completely sworn in, 
even if the objection followed the swearing in of the jurors, the 
Jury Selection Act does not bar this Court's reviewing the 
prosecutor's peremptory challenges. In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546 (Utah 1987), the court explicitly recognized that challenges to 
jury selection that are not based on the Utah Jury Selection Act are 
not governed by the act. Id. at 574 n.115. Thus, Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-46-16 does not govern the timeliness of Mr. Harrison's 
constitutional challenge to the peremptory challenges. 
The State also relies on State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that the issue was waived. While 
- 5 -
Bankhead purports to apply section 78-46-16 to a constitutional 
challenge to jury selection, the opinion is a per curiam decision 
preceding Tillman, in which the court reached the merits of the 
constitutional issue, although the objection was raised after the 
jury was sworn. Bankhead, 727 P.2d at 217-218. 
The State also relies on People v. Harris. 542 N.Y.S.2d 411 
(A.D. 1989), in which the court decided that while the issue was not 
raised prior to the swearing in of the jurors, because Batson had 
not been published at the time the objection was made, the court 
would reach the merits of the issue and reverse the conviction. Id, 
at 412. Prior to doing so, the court explained the purpose of the 
waiver rule: 
The purpose of requiring a prompt objection to 
the discriminatory exercise of peremptory 
challenges is to permit the court to conduct a 
hearing at the earliest opportunity while matters 
are fresh in the minds of the participants, 
especially the Trial Judge. Further, requiring 
that the objection be made before the jury is 
finally sworn will prevent any delay in starting 
the trial if a new venire must be drawn. 
Id. at 411-412. 
The objection and analysis in the instant case occurred 
while the events were still fresh in the minds of the parties and 
trial court and prior to the dismissal of the stricken jurors.5 
5
 In the event that the trial court had found racial 
discrimination in the instant case, it might have been entirely 
appropriate to begin jury selection with a fresh panel, regardless 
of whether the first jury was sworn or not. See Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (the proper remedy for a finding of 
discrimination in jury selection might be dismissal of the jury 
venire and selection of jurors from a new panel). 
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Reference to this Court's opinion in Salt Lake County v. 
Carlston, 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989), further demonstrates that 
it is appropriate for this Court to address the merits of the 
issue. Mr. Harrison's liberty is at stake and he did not delay the 
objection to sandbag his prosecution. See Carlston at 655 n.5 
(indicating that when liberty is at stake, constitutional issues may 
be addressed for the first time on appeal) and at 656 (parties 
should not acquiesce in impanelling of jury and wait to object until 
the case is decided against them). The objection was made prior to 
the dismissal of the stricken jurors. See Carlston at 656 (citing 
several cases rejecting as untimely objections raised after 
prospective jurors are dismissed). Finally, in this case, the 
prosecutor explained his peremptory challenges and the trial court 
ruled on the issue, facilitating this Court's appellate review of 
the issue. Compare Carlston at 656 ("Failure to make a timely 
objection to the exercise of peremptory challenges defeats Batson's 
requirement that their validity be determined first by the trial 
judge on the evidence presented, id., deprives the accused attorney 
of the opportunity to present evidence of any constitutionally 
permissible reasons for challenges to the venire members, and leaves 
the appellate court with no factual basis in the record on which to 
conduct a meaningful review."). 
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B. BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR EXPLAINED THE PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES, THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
TRIGGERING THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO EXPLAIN IS MOOT. 
The arguments concerning the adequacy of the prima facie 
case of discrimination6 are academic in light of the practical 
approach to burdens of proof adopted by the Batson court. In 
footnote 18 of Batson, the Court indicated that the operation of the 
burden of proof rules in these cases is explained in several cases 
decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the 
cases specifically cited by the Batson Court in footnote 18 is 
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 
711 (1983). 
In Aikens, the lower court and both had parties focused on 
whether the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of 
discrimination. The Court indicated that framing the issue in such 
a manner was not appropriate: 
Because this case was fully tried on the merits, 
it is surprising to find the parties and the 
Court of Appeals still addressing the question 
whether Aikens made out a prima facie case. We 
think that by framing the issue in these terms, 
they have unnecessarily evaded the ultimate 
question of discrimination vel non. 
The prima facie case method established in McDonnell 
Douglas was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, 
or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, 
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of 
common experience as it bears on the critical 
question of discrimination." Where the defendant 
has done everything that would be required of him if 
6
 Appellee's brief at 8 through 10. Mr. Harrison's 
appellate counsel, Elizabeth Holbrook, was the first to address this 
moot point, Appellant's brief at 13-14, and regrets the error. 
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the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie 
case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no 
longer relevant. The district court has before 
it all the evidence it needs to decide whether 
"the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff." 
Id. at 715 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
In the instant case, because the prosecutor explained his 
peremptory challenges, Mr. Harrison's having presented a prima facie 
case is no longer an issue before this Court. 
C. THE STATE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRIMA FACIE CASE 
ARE UNDULY FORMALISTIC. 
In its discussion of the "prima facie case," the State 
presents an unduly cramped reading of the record in this case and 
governing precedents. While the issue of the "prima facie case" is 
moot at this point, Mr. Harrison will address the State's discussion 
for purposes of thoroughness. 
1. The record is adequate to establish that 
Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez are racial minorities. 
Contrary to the State's claim that the record does not 
demonstrate that Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez are racial minorities 
(referring to the adequacy of the prima facie case),7 the transcript 
reflects that the trial court recognized that they are racial 
minorities, stating, "I would also indicate to you that it does 
appear to me that there are minorities in this panel [other] than 
7
 Appellee's brief at 9 
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simply Mrs. Gomez....And Mrs. Rezendez, R-E-Z-E-N-D-E-Z, appears, 
likewise, to be potentially a hispanic without us going into that 
question further." (T. 70). 
Other cases demonstrate the adequacy of the record in the 
instant case. See e.g., State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591f 596-597 (Utah 
1988) (challenged juror, a native-born American, did not consider 
himself a minority, conceded that he was Hispanic when pressed on 
the point; there was no evidence that he appeared or sounded 
Hispanic; "Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable 
racial group7 for purposes of equal protection analysis under 
Batson."). 
In light of the purposes behind Batson—to protect jurors 
from racial harassment, to inculcate confidence in the fairness of 
the criminal justice system, and to stop prosecutors from acting on 
racial perceptions, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; Holland v. Illinois, 
493 U.S. , 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 922 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 927 
(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.), 934 
(Stevens, J., dissenting), 110 S.Ct. (1990)—proof of a juror's 
ostensible race is adequate and should not be replaced with a 
detailed inquiry into and proof of a juror's race. 
2. Mr. Harrison's race should not determine his 
eligibility to challenge the prosecutor's 
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. 
In arguing that the trial court's ruling can be upheld 
because Mr. Harrison does not share the race of the stricken jurors 
(again referring to the adequacy of the prima facie case), the State 
- 10 -
cites several cases requiring racial identity between jurors 
stricken and those raising an equal protection claim.8 
Persuasive reasons why a defendant's race should not 
determine whether a prosecutor may challenge potential jurors on 
account of their race are found in the recent decision, Holland v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. , 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 110 S.Ct. (1990). 
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion states: 
To bar the claim whenever the defendant's race is 
not the same as the juror's would be to concede 
that racial exclusion of citizens from the duty, 
and honor, of jury service will be tolerated, or 
even condoned. We cannot permit even the 
inference that this principle will be accepted, 
for it is inconsistent with the equal 
participation in civic life that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees . . . Batson is based in 
large part on the right to be tried by a jury 
whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory 
criteria and on the need to preserve public 
confidence in the jury system. These are not 
values shared only by those of a particular 
color; they are important to all criminal 
defendants. 
Holland, 107 L.Ed.2d 922. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, further explains the bases of the 
Batson decision, which appear to be unrelated to the race of the 
defendant: 
The fundamental principle undergirding the 
decision in Batson was that "a 'State's purposeful 
or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race 
of participation as jurors in the administration of 
justice violates the Equal Protection Clause./ff 
This principle, Justice Powell explained for the 
8
 Appellee's brief at 10 
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Court, has three bases: the right of the 
defendant "to be tried by a jury whose members 
are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory 
criteria"; the right of a member of the 
community not to be assumed incompetent for and 
be excluded from jury service on account of his 
race7 and the need to preserve "public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of 
justice[.]" 
Id, at 924 (citations omitted). The dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stevens explains a similar rationale: 
Our decision in Batson was based on the 
conclusion that "[r]acial discrimination in the 
selection of jurors harms not only the accused 
whose life or liberty they are summoned to try," 
but also "the excluded juror." "Selection 
procedures that purposefully exclude black 
persons from juries undermine public confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice." 
Batson was a black citizen, but he had no 
interest in serving as a juror and thus was not a 
member of the excluded class. His standing to 
vindicate the interests of the potential black 
jurors was based on his status as a defendant. 
Indeed, the suggestion that only defendants of 
the same race or ethnicity as the excluded jurors 
can enforce the jurors' right to equal treatment 
and equal respect recognized in Batson is itself 
inconsistent with the central message of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
. . . [W]hile the inference that the 
discriminatory motive is at work is stronger when 
the excluded jurors are of the same race or 
ethnicity as the defendant, the discriminatory 
use of peremptory challenges is not limited to 
that situation but may be present when, as here, 
the excluded jurors are not of the same race as 
the defendant. 
Id. at 934 (citations omitted). 
In the event that the United States Supreme Court erects a 
same-race rule in federal equal protection peremptory challenge 
cases, such a rule would seem to violate basic tenets of Utah law. 
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For example, Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." In 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the court recognized that 
this constitutional provision was specifically designed to combat 
the arbitrary exercise of government power. Id. at 670. Erection 
of a same-race rule would facilitate the arbitrary exercise of 
government power, allowing even the most blatant cases of racial 
discrimination to stand unexamined, as long as those cases involve 
the racial disparity between the defendant and the jurors. Further, 
Utah Code ann. section 78-46-16 provides, "A citizen shall not be 
excluded or exempt from jury service on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." The Utah Jury 
Selection Act is apparently applicable regardless of the race of the 
defendant being tried. 
In short, if the same-race element of the prima facie case 
were an issue properly before this Court, it would properly be 
resolved in favor of Mr. Harrison, the stricken jurors, and the 
justice system. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S TOLERANCE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE WAS LEGALLY INCORRECT. 
In United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), discussed supra at 8-9, one of the 
cases suggested by the Batson Court as a guide to the procedure of 
the inquiry, see Batson 476 U.S. at 94, n.18, the Court proceeded to 
explain the proper inquiry once there is an explanation of the 
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allegedly discriminatory conduct: 
On the state of the record at the close of 
the evidence, the District Court in this case 
should have proceeded to this specific question 
directly[.] . . . As we stated in [Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248 (1981)]: 
"The plaintiff retains the burden of 
persuasion . . . [H]e may succeed in this 
either directly by persuading the court that 
a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence." 450 
U.S., at 256[.] 
Id. at 715-716 (citations omitted). 
As directed by Aikens, this Court should proceed to 
determine whether the prosecutor's claim that he exercised the 
peremptory challenges with an eye to equal gender representation is 
worthy of credence, or, in the alternative, whether the record as a 
whole establishes that the peremptory challenges were racially 
motivated. 
1. The prosecutor's explanation was lacking in 
credibility and facially inadequate. 
The trial court apparently accepted at face value the 
prosecutor's explanation that the peremptory challenges of Ms. Gomez 
and Ms. Rezendez were exercised on the basis of gender, rather than 
race (T. 78). As noted in Mr. Harrison's opening brief, however, if 
the prosecutor were actually seeking a "gender-balanced" jury, it is 
curious that the prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to 
remove a man when there were eight women and seven men to choose 
- 14 -
from.9 
In addition to lacking credibility, the prosecutor's 
explanation10 was not "neutral," "reasonably specific," "related to 
the case being tried," or "legitimate."11 This case involves no 
facts requiring a certain number of male and female jurors, and even 
if it did, exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender 
is never legitimate. Constitution of Utah, Article IV section 1. 
Because the trial court erroneously accepted the 
prosecutor's inadequate explanation of the challenges, Mr. Harrison 
is entitled to a new trial. Cantu, 778 P.2d at 519. 
2. Other evidence of the prosecutor's 
discriminatory intent calls for a new trial. 
As an alternative to proving the inadequacy of the 
prosecutor's explanation, there is evidence of the prosecutor's 
discriminatory intent, which the trial court failed to acknowledge. 
9
 Appellant's brief at 16. 
1 0
 The prosecutor's explanation was that he wanted a 
gender balanced jury and that Ms. Gomez was the woman he "liked the 
least", and that "for whatever reason", he preferred jurors other 
than Ms. Rezendez (T. 75-77). 
1 1
 See State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) 
("Relying on Batson, it has been found that an explanation given by 
a prosecutor for the exercise of a peremptory challenge must be 
(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and 
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.'") (citation omitted, 
emphasis added). 
12
 The trial court's apparent bases for his conclusion 
that there was no evidence of discrimination were that one of the 
jurors, a Ms. Shelley, appeared to be "of some potential minority," 
and was as likely to be a minority as Ms. Rezendez, and that 
Ms. Gomez was the only one appearing to be "assured of a minority 
race" (T. 70, 78). 
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The prosecutor barely participated in the voir dire—he 
asked the court to inquire which jurors had experience with firearms 
(T. 41) and asked which Hardee's employed Ms. Gomez (she was not 
employed by Hardees; her husband was) (T. 52). When the information 
in the record about Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez is compared with the 
information about the other jurors, there is nothing unique about 
Ms. Gomez and Ms. Rezendez that explains why they were stricken from 
the jury. See Appendix 2 to Appellant's opening brief. The 
prosecutor did not strike other female jurors who were seated on the 
jury (T. 73-74). The prosecutor's reason for striking Ms. Gomez and 
Ms. Rezendez was unrelated to the facts of the case (T. 75-77).13 
Additionally, Mr. Harrison "is entitled to rely on the fact, as to 
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute 
a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who 
are of a mind to discriminate."1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
96 (1986). 
Thus, even if the trial court had been correct in accepting 
the prosecutor's explanation, other evidence of the prosecutor's 
discriminatory intent rendered the peremptory challenges 
intolerable. Mr. Harrison is entitled to a new trial. Cantu, 778 
P.2d at 519. 
13
 See State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518-519 (Utah 1989) 
(citing these factors as proper indicia of discrimination). 
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II. 
MR. HARRISON IS ENTITLED TO 
A NEW TRIAL IN WHICH HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE ARE HONORED. 
In response to Mr. Harrison's claim that the trial court 
violated his right to defend himself by blocking the presentation of 
evidence concerning a previous incident with Crips explaining his 
defensive practice of carrying a gun, and by blocking the 
presentation of evidence of John Bray's inconsistent testimony 
concerning whether Mr. Harrison retrieved his gun in the midst of 
his confrontations with Grant Glover's group,14 the State responds: 
(1) the evidence of the previous gang incident was irrelevant, and 
may have confused the jury;15 (2) Mr. Harrison had an adequate 
opportunity to explain why he carried a gun;16 and (3) presentation 
of the John Bray's preliminary hearing testimony was an improper 
mode of impeachment, and the testimony may have confused the jury.17 
A. MR. HARRISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT 
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE 
FIREBOMBING AND DEATH THREAT. 
Mr. Harrison agrees that the firebombing and death threat 
incident was not relevant to the danger posed by Grant Glover at the 
Persepolis Restaurant.18 It was, however, relevant to show that 
14
 Appellant's opening brief at 18 through 23. 
1 5
 Appellee's brief at 11-12. 
1 6
 Appellee's brief at 13. 
1 7
 Appellee's brief at 13-14. 
1 8
 Appellee's brief at 11-12. 
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Mr. Harrison was carrying his gun all night long for purposes of 
self-protection, and, contrary to the State's contention, did not 
retrieve the gun in the middle of the disputes with Grant Glover's 
group in order to shoot Grant Glover. 
The State's speculations that the jury may have been 
confused into deliberating about the firebombing and death threat 
incident, rather than Grant Glover's death, or that the jury may 
have perceived a connection between the events with "a Black person" 
(Grant Glover) in April and the events with the "Tongans" in April 
at "a totally different location and under different 
circumstances,"19 are unlikely. More important, the speculations 
are outweighed by Mr. Harrison's rights to defend himself in court. 
The State notes that the Court allowed Mr. Harrison to 
testify that he carried a gun all night that night because he had 
been threatened and because "things" had happened to him in the 
past.20 The patent callousness and incredibility of such a vague 
excuse for carrying a loaded firearm in the crowded Persepolis 
restaurant further demonstrates why Mr. Harrison should have been 
allowed to present the actual incident causing him to carry a gun. 
19
 Appellee's brief at 11 through 13. 
2 0
 Appellee's brief at 13. 
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B. MR. HARRISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT 
THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING MR. BRAY'S INCONSISTENT 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING WHETHER MR. HARRISON RETRIEVED 
THE GUN DURING THE DISPUTES WITH MR. GLOVER. 
The State first notes that the trial court found the 
preliminary hearing testimony consistent with Mr. Bray's trial 
testimony, and then indicates that because the preliminary hearing 
testimony is confusing, the trial court was acting within its 
discretion in excluding the preliminary hearing testimony.21 
Mr. Bray's trial testimony and preliminary hearing testimony are 
both confusing. See Appendix 3 to Appellant's opening brief. The 
jurors may fairly have concluded, however, that Mr. Bray's 
preliminary hearing testimony that Mr. Harrison never told Mr. Bray 
that he was going to get a gun (page 2 of Exhibit 25-D lines 3 
through 5) was inconsistent with Mr. Bray's trial testimony that 
Mr. Harrison said that he was going to get a gun before they left 
the Persepolis (T. 267 lines 9 through 11). The confusion in 
Mr. Bray's trial and preliminary hearing testimony on this crucial 
issue should have been resolved by the factfinders in this case, the 
jury. 
The State indicates that reading the preliminary hearing 
transcript to the jurors was not the proper mode of presenting the 
testimony to the jurors, and that defense counsel should have gone 
through the statements with Mr. Bray line by line.22 while defense 
counsel made a diligent effort to discuss the testimony with 
21 Appellee's brief at 14. 
22 Appellee's brief at 14. 
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Mr. Bray, who was apparently confused or uncooperative (see 
Appendix 3 to Appellant's opening brief), she was not limited to 
that mode of impeachment. There is no rule of evidence precluding 
reading the preliminary hearing testimony to the jurors.23 
III. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT 
DENIED MR. HARRISON A FAIR TRIAL. 
A. MARITAL PRIVILEGE 
The State's assertion that the prosecutor argued to the 
trial court that statements made by Mrs. Harrison prior to the 
marriage were admissible in evidence is not supported by a citation 
to the record.24 Mr. Harrison's appellate counsel is unable to 
locate such an argument in the transcript.25 
2 3
 Utah Rule of Evidence 613 provides: "(a) In examining a 
witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or 
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to 
him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or 
disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and 
the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him 
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This 
provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as 
defined in Rule 801(d)(2). 
2 4
 Appellee's brief at 16. 
2 5
 But see M.H. 7, 67-70, where the prosecutor argued that 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 804(a) and (b)(5), Mrs. Harrison's 
preliminary hearing testimony would be admissible. 
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The State's argument that the prosecutor correctly 
addressed communications occurring prior to the marriage26 overlooks 
the fact that prior to the solemnization of the Harrison marriage, 
the Harrisons were married under the common law. At the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor sought to call Mrs. Harrison as a witness, 
and the magistrate began to evaluate whether the Harrisons were 
married at common law. See Utah Code Ann. section 30-1-4.5 (listing 
criteria for common law marriage and indicating that a marriage may 
be recognized as a valid common law marriage at any time during the 
marriage or within one year following the termination of the 
marriage). Prior to a ruling from the magistrate, the prosecutor 
withdrew his request to have Mrs. Harrison testify (M.H. 68; R. 3). 
Regardless of the propriety of the prosecutor's questions 
about the actual communications between the Harrisons, the closing 
argument directly violated the marital privilege. The State 
concedes that the prosecutor's closing argument comment on 
Mr. Harrison's marital privilege was improper.27 
2 6
 Appellee's brief at 16-20. 
2 7
 The prosecutor argued, "Instruction No. 10. This is a 
very interesting one. A married person may not be forced to testify 
in any criminal action against their spouse. What's the assistance 
of that? Well, there is a preliminary hearing of this matter on the 
17th of May and the defendant gets married in July. And the trial 
is in August. Isn't it interesting that one of the two people who 
got told about the gun in the waistband was the wife who can't 
testify?" (T. 640) (emphasis added). 
Appellee's concession of error is apparently limited to the 
language emphasized above. Appellee's brief at 20. 
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After noting that the trial court erroneously denied the 
objection to this comment, the State asserts that the comment was 
not prejudicial because there was another witness who was told about 
the gun in the waistband who did not testify and because other 
witnesses had not been told about the gun.28 Mr. Harrison's 
appellate counsel is unable to ascertain to whom the prosecutor was 
referring when he mentioned the other person who had been told about 
the gun in the waistband but did not testify, if such a person was 
referred to in evidence at all. It is difficult to imagine how the 
existence of any "other person" or the fact that other witnesses had 
not been told about the gun would cure the prejudice caused by the 
prosecutor's drawing attention to the fact that Mrs. Harrison, who 
was repeatedly identified in court as a spectator during the trial 
(e.g. T. 93, 145, 192), did not testify in support of her husband 
because of the marital privilege. 
B. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The State argues that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), 
which forbids the impeachment use of a defendant's silence after 
arrest and Miranda warnings, does not apply to the prosecutor's 
references to Mr. Harrison's failure to speak with the police, 
because there is no evidence that Mr. Harrison was silent.29 
2 8
 Appellee's brief at 20. 
2 9
 Appellee's brief at 22-24. 
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While Mr. Harrison may not have invoked his right to remain silent, 
and while Mr. Harrison may have spoken with the police after he was 
arrested and prior to trial, the clear implication of the 
prosecutor's closing argument was that Mr. Harrison remained 
silent. 
The closing argument began with a prosecutor's apology to 
the jurors concerning the supposedly overly detailed manner in which 
the State had presented its case. He explained the length of the 
State's case by detailing the investigating officer's task in 
putting this case together, discussing how the various witnesses 
were identified and located and discussing the evolution of the case 
in the investigator's mind (T. 632-634). During the prosecutor's 
reconstruction of the case, he made no mention of Mr. Harrison's 
speaking with the police (T. 632-634). As the culmination of this 
argument, the prosecutor stated: 
Finally Mr. Harrison said, yeah, that's 
true. For the first time on the stand he said 
yep, I pulled the trigger. It was me. What 
Detective Johnson has known, believed all along, 
you have confirmed so easily. The defendant 
said, Yep, I pulled the trigger. 
Well, why do we have to go through all that 
work? Why do we have to bring in a doctor and 
prove that Grant Glover was dead? Why did we 
have to bring in a ballistics guy to talk about 
the bullet? Why did we have to have John Bray 
come in here and say my friend shot him? Because 
until this man admitted it we had the burden of 
proving it. We have to be ready to prove it from 
the very beginning of the trial, not the middle. 
And for that, the State apologizes, but it's this 
representative of the State's job to make sure 
that everything possible is covered so that there 
is no doubt and that that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is established from the very 
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beginning of the trial and not just in the 
middle, because you see, the defendant has no 
obligation to say anything at all. 
(T. 634-635). 
If the prosecutor's closing argument concerning 
Mr. Harrison's post-arrest silence was not based in fact, additional 
concerns about the ethical performance of the prosecutor arise. See 
State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 454 (Utah 1982) ("A prosecutor may 
not assert arguments he knows to be inaccurate."). 
The State's claim that the objection to the prosecutor's 
question, "Did you make any efforts through any means whatsoever to 
let the police know that the other man had a gun?", was that the 
question "assumed that defendant would entreat others to tell the 
police that there was a gun"30 does not make sense. When the 
prosecutor asked the aforementioned question and defense counsel 
objected on "the same grounds previously made" (T. 506), it appears 
that she was referring to the objection discussed at the bench 
conference after the prosecutor asked, "Isn't it true that the first 
time that anyone on the prosecution side has ever heard anything 
about a gun, as far as you know, is yesterday when you testified 
about it?" (T. 504). The fact that the bench conference was not 
recorded is not fairly held against Mr. Harrison. See State v. 
Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 936, nn. 3 and 5 (Utah App. 1990) (instructing 
trial courts to have the bench conferences recorded). 
3 0
 Appellee's brief at 22. 
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The State's argument that the jury would not construe the 
questions as comments on Mr. Harrison's silence because his 
invocation of his right to silence was not mentioned31 misses the 
point of Doyle: "The point of the Doyle holding is that it is 
fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence 
will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise 
by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony." Wainwriaht v. 
Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986). 
C. OTHER IMPROPER COMMENTS 
The State ignores the case law governing comments 
destroying the attorney client privilege,32 and seeks to justify 
this and other improper comments of the prosecutor (for example, the 
argument calling attention to the fact that Mr. Harrison had watched 
the other witnesses testify and had an interest in being acquitted) 
by noting that the comments made by the prosecutor may have occurred 
to the jurors.33 The fact that the jurors may have made the same 
assumptions the prosecutor argued does not justify the arguments, 
which were fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence. See State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973) ("The 
test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so objectionable as 
to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the remarks call 
3 1
 Appellee's brief at 22-23. 
3 2
 See Appellant's opening brief at 29. 
33
 Appellee's brief at 27. 
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to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in determining their verdict, and [2] were 
they, under the circumstances of the particular case, probably 
influence by those remarks.") (emphasis added). 
IV. 
BECAUSE IT WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF MR. HARRISON'S 
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, 
THE GUN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
The State seeks to justify the improper search of the 
Harrison's diaper bag and seizure of Mr. Harrison's gun34 as a 
search incident to arrest,35 and argues that Mr. Harrison has no 
standing to object to the search of the diaper bag.36 
The State argues that the trial court's statement, fl[T]he 
court finds that the diaper bag was principally the property of 
Ms. Yazzie, or Mrs. Harrison as she is known now," (M.H. 59) was a 
finding that Mr. Harrison lacked standing to challenge the search of 
the diaper bag and the seizure of his gun.37 That language of the 
trial court was never tied to standing, nor was standing ever argued 
by the prosecution. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah 
App. 1990) (prosecutor must give defendant notice "that he will be 
put to his proof" on the standing issue). The statement most likely 
34
 Appellant's opening brief at 33-38. 
3 5
 Appellee's brief at 30-32. 
3 6
 Appellee's brief at 29-30. 
3 7
 Appellee's brief at 29-30. 
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refers to defense counsel's argument that the State should not have 
resorted to seeking Mrs. Harrison's consent as a subterfuge to avoid 
Mr. Harrison's assertion of his privacy rights in the bag and gun 
(M.H. 52). 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court's statement was a 
finding that Mr. Harrison had no standing to challenge the search of 
the bag because it was not his property (M.H. 59) , it was 
inconsistent with recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court 
demonstrating that privacy rights are not tied to ownership, but are 
tied to reasonable expectations of privacy. See e.g. O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (majority of the Court held that a state 
employed doctor had a privacy interest in his office, and the entire 
Court held that he had a privacy interest in his desk and cabinets); 
Minnesota v. Olsen, No. 88-1916, 47 Cr.L 2031 (April 18, 
1990) (Court recognized a privacy interest in property occupied by 
overnight houseguests). 
Mr. Harrison had not only a property interest in the gun 
seized, but also a reasonable expectation of privacy in the family 
diaper bag. 
Defense counsel was the first to address the 
inapplicability of the search incident to arrest theory as a 
justification of the search in the instant case (M.H. 52, 55). The 
prosecutor did not argue this theory, but relied on Mrs. Harrison's 
consent (M.H. 56-57). The trial court did not find that the 
warrantless search was justified as a search incident to arrest, but 
relied on Mrs. Harrison's consent (M.H. 59). 
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At the time that Mr. and Mrs. Harrison were arrested and 
the bag was patted down, Mr. and Mrs. Harrison were subdued by the 
police and not proximate to the bag (Appellee's brief 28-29). The 
State did not present any evidence that the gun was within the scope 
of Mr. or Mrs. Harrison's control, and hence, the search cannot be 
justified as a search incident to arrest. See Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (arrestee's area of immediate control, 
which may be searched in a valid search incident to arrest, is "the 
area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.11); State v. Arroyo. 137 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 1990) (it is the State's burden to establish an 
exception to the warrant requirement in seeking to submit evidence 
seized in a warrantless search). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Mark Harrison 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this V"£& day of October, 1990. 
VERNICE S. AH CHING 3 / / " 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ELTZABETH HOLBRC 
Attorney for' Defendant/Appellant 
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APPENDIX 1 
TRANSCRIPT OF 
TIMING OF BATSON OBJECTION 
I 
I 
I 
4 
IN COURT JURY SELECTION (CONTINUED) 
f 
r 
* 
t 
i 
t 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET ME ASK ONE FINAL QUESTION NOW. 
j«LL ASK YOU TO PUT A MIRROR IN FRONT OF YOUR FACE AND ASK 
YOU THIS. IF YOU WERE TO BE ACCUSED OF AN OFFENSE BEFORE 
THIS COURT AS MR. HARRISON IS IS THERE ANY REASON WHY YOU 
WOULD NOT WANT SOMEONE OF YOUR MIND-SET AND DISPOSITION 
TO SIT IN JUDGMENT OF YOU, IF SO, WOULD YOU RAISE YOUR HAND? 
THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE TO 
M l THAT QUESTION. 
11 J I WILL ASK YOU, COUNSEL, IF YOU PASS THE PANEL 
12 FOR CAUSE SUBJECT TO THE DISCUSSION IN CHAMBERS? 
I*| MR. COPE: STATE DOES, YOUR HONOR. 
M S . LOY: • THE DEFENSE DOES, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
14
 I (WHEREUPON, THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE PASSED 
17
 J FOR CAUSE BY BOTH COUNSEL; WHEREUPON, COUNSEL EXERCISED 
THEIR PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES; AND WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING 
JURORS WERE SELECTED): 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I'LL ASK THE CLERK 
TO READ THE NAMES OF THE JURORS SELECTED. AND I'LL ASK 
YOU, AS YOUR NAME IS READ, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND AND REMAIN 
STANDING. 
14 
IS 
It 
It 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
THE CLERK: DWANLES BENNETT, JR., 
25 | CAROL CAMBURN, 
MARILYN W. RASMUSSEN, 
73 
TINA BALL, 
ROBERT FERRERI, 
ETHAN DELAVAN, 
GLORIA SHELLEY, 
JANIE POULSON. 
-. JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. COUNSEL, IS THIS THE 
$ I JURY THAT YOU HAVE SELECTED? 
j I MR. COPE: IT IS. 
I I M S . L O Y : IT. IS, YOUR HONOR. 
fI JUDGE YOUNG: WE'LL_ASK ALL OF YOU TO RAISE YOUR 
)0 I SIGHT HAND AND RECEIVE AN OATH FROM THE C L E R K . 
|t | CWHEREUPON, THE JURORS WERE SWORN IN AND 
12 I IMPANELED AT THIS TIME) 
tJ 
14 I JUDGE YOUNG: YOUR HQNOR, MAY WE APPROACH THE 
15 BENCH BEFORE YOU PROCEED WITH THIS? 
t« JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. 
1* CWHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND 
U COUNSEL WAS HELD AT THE BENCH, AFTER WHICH,. THE FOLLOWING 
'• PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD): 
20 
21
 I JUDGE YOUNG: WE HAVE A MATTER WE NEED TO TAKE 
22
 I UP WHICH IS A MATTER OF LAW. I WILL ASK YOU NOT TO LEAVE. 
23
 JUST BE SEATED A N D REMAIN IN THE SAME P O S I T I O N THAT YOU 
24
 I ARE, O B V I O U S L Y , AND WE'LL TAKE THE MATTER UP IN CHAMBERS. 
25 
L 7" 
9 
MOTION IN CHAMBERS 
5 
f 
1 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT WE'RE 
AGAIN CONVENED PRIOR TO THE IMPANELING OF THE FINAL JURY 
AT THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE TO MAKE OBJECTIONS AS TO THE 
METHOD OF THE STATE IN EXERCISING ITS CHALLENGES. 
MS. LOY: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. OUR MOTION 
I | IS BASED UPON THE RECENT SUPREME COURT CASE OF MATSON. 
| I AND I'M SORRY, I DON'T .REMEMBER THE TOTAL NAME. I'M SURE 
M THE COURT IS FAMILIAR WITH IT. BASICALLY, THAT IT IS OUR 
|| ] BELIEF THAT THE STRIKING OF TWO HISPANICS WHERE THERE ARE 
12 TWO, THE ONLY TWO APPARENT OR POTENTIAL MINORITIES ON THE 
|| PANEL, APPEARS TO BE A SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF MINORITIES 
14 FROM THE DEFENDANT'S JURY 9Y THE STATE'S PEREMPTORIES. 
15 AND I BELIEVE THAT REQUIRES A SHOWING OF A RACIALLY 
16 NEUTRAL REASON BY THE PROSECUTION WHEN THAT IS RAISED. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT- MR. COPE, THE QUESTION 
l« HAS BEEN RAISED IN RELATION TO YOUR CHALLENGE EXERCISED 
19 AS NO. 3 TO—I'M NOT SURE, IS IT MARY GOMEZ, JUROR NO. 7? 
20 CAN YOU TELL US THE BASIS OF THAT AS TO WHY YOU EXERCISED 
21 I THAT CHALLENGE? 
22 MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, I STRUCK MS. GOMEZ ON 
23 MY THIRD CHALLENGE NOT BECAUSE OF HER NAME OF "GOMEZ" OR 
2* BECAUSE SHE APPARED TO BE HISPANIC BUT BECAUSE SHE WAS A 
25
 WOMAN. I WAS LABORING TO TRY AND GET A BALANCED PANEL. 
75 
I ALMOST SUCCEEDED. AS THE COURT WILL NOTE THERE ARE THREE 
MEN AND FIVE WOMEN. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE FOUR 
WOMEN AND FOUR MEN. SHE WAS SIMPLY THE WOMAN WHOM I LIKED 
THE LEAST AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT IN THE PROCESS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. AND THE SECOND CHALLENGE! 
AS TO YOUR EXERCISING YOUR FOURTH PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AS 
TO JUROR NO. 19, SYLVIA RESENDEZ? 
MR. COPE: AGAIN, THAT'S VERY SIMILAR, YOUR HONOR 
IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT AT THAT POINT WE WERE GOING TO 
HAVE MS. RESENDEZ, MS. SHELLEY AND MS. POULSON AND I COULD 
TAKE ONE OF THESE THREE AND MS. RESENDEZ WAS THE ONE WHO, 
FOR WHATEVER REASON, WAS LEAST LIKELY TO BE THE TYPE OF 
JUROR THAT I WANTED. ONCE AGAIN, I WAS TRYING TO TAKE A 
WOMAN RATHER THAN A MAN SINCE IT WAS NOW DOWN TO THE POINT 
WHERE THE ONLY WAY WE COULD HAVE A BALANCED PANEL IS IF 
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL TOOK A WOMAN ON THEIR LAST PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE. I DECIDED THAT I LIKED MS. SHELLEY AND MS. 
POULSON BETTER THAN I LIKED MS. RESENDEZ, ALTHOUGH, I MUST 
ADMIT I WAS A LITTLE 8IT WORRIED ABOUT THIS COUSIN OF MS. 
SHELLEY WHO WAS ACCUSED OF MURDER. I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT 
WAS RESOLVED, ONLY THAT IT WAS RESOLVED. I CERTAINLY HOPE 
THAT HE WASN'T ACQUITTED AND SHE THINKS HE'S GUILTY, OR 
CONVICTED AND SHE THINKS HE'S INNOCENT, OR SOMETHING LIKE 
THAT. BUT I PREFERRED MS. SHELLEY, WHO, FROM APPEARANCE 
SAKE, APPEARS TO BE FROM A MINORITY GROUP, BY THE WAY, EVEN 
76 
E l 
E l 
r« 
,9 
$ 
I 
I 
P 
HI 
jKOUGH SHE HAS SHELLEY AS 0 I AST NAMF 
AND I [ 'REFERRED M1. . I'UUl SON i n Mr.) RESENDEZ, 
• 1 i ipl l I I / M i I Ml'I I • 
JUDGE YOUNG' A l ' B , r - H T 
MS , I.UY , m i l l * HONOR 
J I I I : I I , I 111 i i i i l i n n i i i i HI-' T in R E C O R D : 
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H I M1 l - 'ESENDtZ I H t R h ' b ABSOLU1LLY n k i I M i l l INFORM M i l 
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I I 
l l 
I I 
II 
II 
II 
l l 
I I 
20 
III 
II 
I I 
Ml I | I I II I M M l M l Ml II hi I irfHFRI' ' (1Mb 
ITr i t iv J U P O K . I A P P A R L N U I i v t . 
AND A') ID M i l,UMl *T THERE WA V b. k i U T I L E I N I M 1 
i i i mi III i i inn i mi 11 ii M I i i ii i in MUM in i nrr ' s 
.HO 1 I t 01- S l k l k l N G IHbM A P P L A R j I d Ml Ml M M H i U I 
WERTONE OF IHFSF AhT I HE PEOPM I M M I HE LET A I I 
'• i r v i u 
I ) INAPPROPRIATE AND I I M1141 I I U L N I L J M» D f c l L N I u l l l HI 
OPPORTUNITY TO HAVL A HAIR CROSS-SECTION OF I HI- .OMMUNITY 
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CANNOT FIND THE EXERCISE OF CHALLENGES 3 AND *f WERE, IN 
ANY WAY, RACIALLY MOTIVATED IN ANY RESPECT AND I DON'T 
BELIEVE THAT THE LAW REQUIRES THAT ONE LEAVE ON RACIALLY 
—A PERSON OF MINORITY RACE, AS AN OBLIGATION. I THINK 
WHAT IT DOES IS IT ALLOWS SOMEONE TO EXERCISE THEIR CHALLENGE] 
AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL. AND I DON'T FIND ANY RACIAL MOTIVATION] 
IN THE EXERCISE. MR. COPE HAS INDICATED HE EXERCISED IT 
BY BALANCE. 
I, PREVIOUS TO THIS, HAD SAID THAT IT APPEARED 
10 I TO ME THAT MS. SHELLEY WAS AS LIKELY TO BE A MINORITY, OR 
I! FROM A MINORITY RACE, AS MS. RESENDEZ, AND MRS. GOMEZ WAS 
12 ABOUT THE ONLY ONE THAT APPEARED TO BE ASSURED OF A MINORITY 
13 RACE. SO I DON'T FIND THAT THE STATE HAS EXERCISED THEIR 
M CHALLENGES IN ANY WAY IMPROPERLY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE 
15 DEFENSE IS DENIED. 
1« M S . LOY: THANK YOU. 
'
7
 I (WHEREUPON, THE MOTIONS WERE CONCLUDED). 
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IN-COURT JURY SELECTION (CONTINUED) 
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